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Financial Uncertainty in Germany and its 
Impact on Western European Terrorism
Abstract
This paper analyses the link between the VDAX as a proxy for European ﬁ  nancial 
uncertainty and the number of terror incidents in Western Europe. Considering 
data of the Global Terrorism Database, the number of terror incidents does – on 
average – not aﬀ  ect ﬁ  nancial uncertainty. In contrast, based on a behavioral model 
of terrorism motivated by Schmid and de Graaf (1982), lagged ﬁ  nancial uncertainty 
contains information for the risk of terror events. Estimation results of the negative 
binominal quasi maximum likelihood count data model conﬁ  rm an inverse impact of 
lagged ﬁ  nancial uncertainty on terrorism. Furthermore, empirical evidence leads to 
the conclusion of average lead time for terror incidents of 6 month. These results are 
potentially important for terror prevention.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: C25, G02, Z10
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de. 1 Introduction
Terrorism is not a phenomenon which can be reduced to the events in Septem-
ber 2001 in the United States, but also a real phenomenon in Europe. At-
tacks in European capital cities like Madrid (March 11, 2004), Amsterdam
(November 2, 2004), London (July 7, 2005) and Oslo (July 22, 2011) at-
tracted a great deal of attention in Europe. Moreover, the public discussion
of neonazi attacks in Germany (November 2011) whip the political discussion
about security agencies and its cooperation against terrorism. In contrast,
national security agencies were able to prevent many terror attacks. For ex-
ample, on December 14, 2009, a Spanish law court adjudged 11 persons for
planning a terror attack, in September 2009 British citizens were adjudged
for the same intention and on March 4, 2010, a German law court delivered
the judgment against the so-called ”Sauerland-Gruppe”. Hence, committed
and prevented terror events are very present in the media and provoke many
discussions.
The real phenomenon of terrorism aﬀects the society obviously in many
ways. Focusing on economic consequences of terrorism, a branch of research
can be identiﬁed. This literature deals with the impact of terrorism on eco-
nomic growth. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008, 2011) emphasize the potential
transmission through decreasing foreign direct investments as a response to
terrorism. Moreover, controlling the terrorism is costly and may cause cut-
backs of public spending. Especially the government spending can be a large
drain on private investment, and with it, growth (Blomberg, Hess, and Or-
phanides (2004)). Furthermore, fundamental terror attacks like 9/11 cause
ﬁnancial uncertainty shocks and lead to passivity of economic agents, which
creates a downturn of economic output (Bloom (2009)). But it is at least
questionable that ”normal” terror events inﬂuence ﬁnancial market partici-
pants, due to their focus on economic fundamentals or economic speculations.
In turn, it is interesting to analyze the impact of ﬁnancial uncertainty on ter-
ror events, in order to characterize a date in time as critical with respect to
terror events. If a counterfactual motivated relationship between ﬁnancial
uncertainty and terror events is empirically stable, this could be important
in terms of the prevention of terrorism (see Haverkamp (2011)). The aim
of this paper is the identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial uncertainty in Germany as a
variable with predictive power for terror events in Western Europe1 and the
rejection of the hypothesis that ”normal” terror events inﬂuence ﬁnancial
uncertainty in this region. Institutional research on terrorism in Germany
as the largest European economy is conducted by the Bundeskriminalamt
1The appendix shows the deﬁnition of Western Europe.
4(Federal Criminal Police Oﬃce) and the Bundesamt f¨ ur Verfassungsschutz
(Federal Oﬃce for the Protection of the Constitution). A collection of pa-
pers - published by the Bundeskriminalamt - concerning the predictability of
terrorism can be found in Kemmesies (2006).
In general, terror events are classiﬁed as domestic and transnational at-
tacks. Domestic incidents are homegrown in which the venue, target and per-
petrators are all from the same country. In case of Islamist terrorism Puschn-
erat (2006) emphasizes the issue of ”home made terrorism”, hence, domestic
terrorism. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) generalize this conclusion
to terrorism at all and show the causality in the Granger sense of domestic for
transnational terrorism. Consequently, domestic and transnational terrorism
should be considered in terrorism research. Diﬀerent databases are currently
applied in the literature. Since the 1960er, the ”International Terrorism:
Attributes of Terrorist Events” (ITERATE) database lists transnational in-
cidents. In the past, this database was frequently used, due to the former
ﬁxation on this type of terrorism. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) merge
the ITERATE database and ”Terrorism in Western Europe: Event Data”
(TWEED) database of Engene (2007), thereby distinguishing transnational
and domestic events for the period from 1950 to 2004. The ”Global Terrorism
Database” (GTD) is the ﬁrst worldwide database that includes domestic and
transnational incidents for the period from 1970 to 2007. Enders et al. (2011)
separate the GTD of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) into domestic and transnational events and
calibrate the dataset.2 As long as this paper concentrates on Western Eu-
rope, the calibrated GTD contains more recent observations than the merged
ITERATE and TWEED databases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a counterfactual
motivated behavioral model of terror incidents. Subsequently, section 3 de-
scribes the data and section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes
the ﬁndings. Further explanations are relegated to the appendix.
2 Behavioral model
The understanding of terrorist behavior is an interdisciplinary issue and asks
for communication between several ﬁelds of research. This is the reason why
Kemmesies (2006) contains papers from diverse scientists working on social
sciences, political sciences, psychology, sociology, economics, history and cul-
tural anthropology. Understanding stable behavioral structures of terrorism
is the key to the construction of forecasting models. Consequently, at the
2The empirical results of this paper rely on the dataset of Enders et al. (2011).
5best an interdisciplinary discussion leads to the formulation of a statistical
model for the purpose of prediction based on data. It is unlikely to expect
that a terror event at a point in time can be predicted by a forecasting model.
Hence, a point estimate should not be the goal of statistical models for ter-
rorism. From a micro perspective it is conceivable that a statistical model
evaluates the probability for a person being a terrorist. From a macro per-
spective it is also thinkable that the risk for terror incidents during a speciﬁc
period could be calculated based on a statistical model. These predictions
could help to prevent further terror attacks and would be an asset in the
ﬁght against terrorism.
In this paper the main argumentation for a speciﬁc and stable terrorist
behavior relies on Schmid and de Graaf (1982). Their work is reducible to the
formula ”terrorism is a violent strategy of communication”. Terrorists are
not very much interested in attacking speciﬁc persons, but they are predom-
inately interested in the presentation of their ideology in the media. Hence,
the utility u felt by a terrorist j of a terror event E at time t,t h u suj,t(E),
is high, if the event is able to provoke much of the media attention. Media
institutions will report on terror events as long as the citizens are interested
in terrorism. If a considerable other event A occurs, the society’s attention
deviates from the terror event and the citizens would not pay their whole
attention to the terror event. Therefore, the unconditional utility uj,t(E)
would be higher than the conditional utility uj,t(E|A). What event A has
the potential to attract the attention of many persons? Not at least the latest
economic crisis underlines the deep impact of ﬁnancial uncertainty on human
attention. For example, the latest ﬁnancial crisis causes extraordinary rescue
packages of European countries to support the banking system. This ﬁnan-
cial assistance is ﬁnally paid by tax payers and aﬀects the society as a whole.
In case of the Greek-dept crisis the same mechanism holds. In line with this
argumentation Bloom (2009) shows in a more elaborate model that ﬁnancial
uncertainty shocks lead to inactivity of the economy. Hence, economic sub-
jects concern oneself much with the issue of ﬁnancial uncertainty. This leads
to the conclusion that a ”rational” terrorist commits an attack during periods
of low other distress - especially in the way of ﬁnancial uncertainty - due to
relatively high individual utility of the attack. Consider now ﬁnancial uncer-
tainty not as a single event A, but as a stochastic process At with numerical
realizations at. It would be far from reality to assume that a terror attack can
be committed without lead time L. The expected conditional utility of a ter-




holds for a1,t >a 2,t and the dependence between ue
j,t+L and at is negative.
The negative dependence implies a type of terrorist, which is avers towards
ﬁnancial uncertainty. In the ﬁrst instance this conclusion sounds strange due
6to the background of the 9/11 events. This fundamental event was intended
for destabilization and for increasing ﬁnancial uncertainty. But in this paper
I rise the question of an ”optimal” moment for a terror attack and not the
question concerning the consequences of an incident.
Many hypotheses of utility functions with negative marginal eﬀects can
be formulated. Linear functions imply constant reactions of utility to uncer-
tainty. It is likely to expect that the marginal response varies with the level
of uncertainty. In a high uncertainty regime the utility of an incident is low,
no matter if the uncertainty level is high or extreme high. Thus, the utility
function should exhibit a lower bound. In contrast, the marginal reactions in
low or intermediate uncertainty regimes are supposed to diﬀer substantially,
due to diﬀerent human behavior depending on the level of uncertainty. Con-
sequently, consider the following assumptions:
Behavioral hypothesis 1:
The percentage change of the individual expected utility of a terror event
decreases with increasing ﬁnancial uncertainty.













with the corresponding variable elasticity −β/atue
j,t+L(E|at).
Behavioral hypothesis 2:
The number of terror incidents are proportional to individual expected utility
of a terror event.
The second behavioral hypothesis accounts for the assumption that the ex-
pected utility of a terror event acts like an incentive for terror incidents. For




with the proportionality factor γ>0 holds. Combining equation (2) and (3)
leads to the explanation of terror incidents by the inverse model




it = β1 + β2a
−1
t−L (5)
with β1 = αγ and β2 = βγ. Hence, the behavioral hypotheses suggest the
dependence structure between ﬁnancial uncertainty and number of terror
incidents illustrated in Figure 1.
it
at−L
Figure 1: Hypothetical dependence between lagged ﬁnancial uncertainty at−L
and number of terror incidents it.
3D a t a
The previous section emphasizes the importance of ﬁnancial uncertainty for
terror events. A canonical and frequently used proxy for ﬁnancial uncertainty
is expected stock market volatility (see e.g. Bloom (2009)). Such an uncer-
tainty proxy is constructed by using options of a speciﬁc underlying stock
market index. Prominent examples are the VIX for the S&P 500 in the USA,
VFTSE for the FTSE 100 in the UK and the VDAX3 f o rt h eD A Xi nG e r -
many. The VDAX was introduced by the Deutsche B¨ orse AG in April 2005
and is backward projected until January 1992. Although, this paper focuses
on Western Europe, I will use the longer time series of the VDAX instead
of the shorter European time series of the VSTOXX. As long as Germany is
the largest economy in Europe, the VDAX seems to be an appropriate proxy
3In order to ease the notion, the new VDAX is labelled VDAX.
8for European ﬁnancial uncertainty. Monthly median values of daily clos-
ing prices of the VDAX4 represents ﬁnancial uncertainty during a month.
Median values have two nice properties in comparison to averages: Firstly,
median values are robust against outliers. Secondly, the time aggregation
by a mean value introduces artiﬁcial serial correlation (see Granger (1980)),
which potentially biases the estimation of time dynamics. Therefore, the ap-
plication of median values is common practice (see i.e. Deutsche Bundesbank
(2010)5). Considering monthly values for the period from January 1992 to
December 2007 leads to 192 observations and allows therefore for powerful
unit root tests. The ADF and GLS-ADF unit root test of the time series
rejects the hypothesis of nonstationarity on the 5% level. Figure 2 illustrates














Figure 2: Monthly median of daily VDAX closing prices.
The following construction of a time series of terror events uses calibrated
GTD data of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011). They deﬁne terrorism in style
of the US Department of State as premediated use or threat to use vio-
lence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order
to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large
audience beyond that of the immediate victims. The major advantage of the
4The time series code for the daily VDAX closing prices in Euro is ”VDAXNEW” (Thomp-
son Datastream).
5The Deutsche Bundesbank calculates median values of credit default swap premiums of
all ﬁnancial institutes in a ﬁnancial system as a proxy for the risk of a ﬁnancial system.
9Table 1: Numbers and ratios of incidents
Terror type World Europe World terror European terror
type ratio in % type ratio in %
Domestic 18871 1733 71 51
Transnational 5280 1502 20 44
Unknown 2525 179 9 5
Sum 26676 3414 100 100
Sample: January 1992 to December 2007
GTD database is the large collection of domestic and transnational terror
incidents worldwide. Domestic incidents are homegrown in which the venue,
target and perpetrators are all from the same country. Therefore, domestic
terrorism inﬂuences directly the venue country in several ways (institutions,
citizen, property, politics). Table 1 allows for an overview of the data. If
the counterfactual argumentation of Puschnerat (2006) and the empirical
conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that domestic terrorism causes transnational
terrorism (see Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011)) is neglected, the number of
European incidents would decrease by a half. Assigning every European in-


























Figure 3: Monthly numbers of terror incidents in Europe (overall 3414).
10of European overall incidents (i.e. domestic, transnational and unknown).
Figure 3 illustrates the development of the incidents. On every plausible
level of signiﬁcance the ADF and GLS-ADF unit root test rejects the hy-
pothesis of nonstationarity of incidents. In fact, a trend stationary process is
indicated, which is not very surprising. During the ﬁrst years of the 1990er
a lot of terror events occurred in Europe because of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA), Red Army Faction (RAF) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).
During the subsequent years the number of incidents decreased due to strat-
egy changes of terror organizations and lead to a negative trend of European
incidents.
Interpret now monthly median values of daily VDAX closing prices as
German ﬁnancial uncertainty in month t and denote them by VDAXt.E I t
stands for the number of European incidents in month t. The cross correl-
ogram between EIt and VDAXt−l, l =1 ,2,..., shows the largest negative
correlation for l = 6. In line with the behavioral model in equation (5) the
corresponding lead time of a terror attack seems to be L = 6 month. Figure 4
shows the scatter plot between EIt and VDAXt−6 and serves as a stylized fact
of the validity of the behavioral model, due to the similarity of the scatter
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Figure 4: Scatter plot between European incidents - EI - and lagged German
ﬁnancial uncertainty - VDAX. The solid line shows the nearest neighbor ﬁt.
114 Empirical results
Concerning the question whether ﬁnancial uncertainty responses to terrorism
consider the following regression:
VDAXt = α1 + α2VDAXt−1 + α3dasia + α4drussia + α5d9/11
+α6denron + α7dgulf + α8dcrunch + εt
(6)
Included dummy variables d are explained in more detail in Table 2 of the
appendix. These dummy variables reﬂect fundamental shocks to ﬁnancial
uncertainty in Germany. In Table 3 of the appendix speciﬁcation a) shows
amongst others the regression results. Financial uncertainty exhibits rela-
tively high persistence due to signiﬁcant autoregressive dependence expressed
in the estimate  α2. An eﬀect of terror on uncertainty is only evident for the
fundamental shocks on 9/11. The augmentation of equation (6) by EIt−l,
l =0 ,1,..., leads to highly insigniﬁcant corresponding coeﬃcient estimates.
Hence, terror has only an eﬀect in case of very fundamental events. ”Normal”
terrorism in Europe is not able to inﬂuence ﬁnancial uncertainty systemati-
cally.
The argumentation of section 2 that lagged ﬁnancial uncertainty inﬂu-
ences the number of terror events is the counterfactual basis of the following
regression model:
EIt = β1 + β2t + β3EIt−1 + β4VDAX
−1
t−L + β5daugust 2001 +  t (7)
Due to decreasing number of terror events (see section 3) the time trend
augments the speciﬁcation. daugust 2001 symbolizes the dummy variable for
August 2001. EIt−1 accounts for the persistence of incidents. Hence, the time
trend t and EIt−1 model the time dynamics of the process EIt and daugust 2001
absorbs a shock during the previous month of 9/11. As suggested by the
cross correlogram between EIt and VDAXt−l, l =1 ,2,..., the ﬁnal eﬃcient
estimation results identify L = 6 as the appropriate lag. Since EIt stands
for the number of terror incidents, the eﬃcient methodological estimation
framework must be a count data model. Therefore, the initial estimation of
the regression is a Poisson model. Results are documented in approach b)
of Table 3 (see appendix). In order to test for overdispersion in the Poisson
model according to Cameron and Trivedi (1990) consider the test regression
(EIt −  EIt,poisson)
2 − EIt = γ1 EI
2
t,poisson + et,1 , (8)
where  EIt,poisson stands for the forecasts of EIt based on the coeﬃcients of
the Poisson regression of equation (7). Table 3 contains the OLS results
12for γ1 and indicates signiﬁcant overdispersion of the residuals. In order to
check the robustness of this test result, the alternative test of Wooldridge
(1997) is considered. With   t,standard as standardized residuals of the Poisson
regression of equation (7), we obtain the test regression
  
2
t,standard − 1=γ2 EIt,poisson + et,2 . (9)
In line with the previous test, Wooldridge’s test suggests the presence of
overdispersion (positive estimate for γ2, see Table 3). Given the rejection
of the Poisson restriction, the two step negative binomial QMLE (quasi-
generalized pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation) with the QML param-
eter  γ2 of the OLS estimation of equation (9) will be applied according to
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984a, 1984b). The corresponding es-
timation results are available in approach c) of Table 3. If VDAX
−1
t−6 is
neglected in equation (7), signiﬁcant serial correlation of the standardized
residuals und residual squares is introduced into the model. This leads to
the conclusion that ﬁnancial uncertainty contains information for the expla-
nation of terror events. Less ﬁnancial uncertainty increases the probability
for a terror event ( β4 =1 1 .028). Furthermore, the lead time of a terror attack
seems to be 6 month on average. The negative sign of the trend coeﬃcient
estimate  β2 indicates decreasing terror events during the sample. It is inter-
esting to note, that during the previous month of 9/11 a signiﬁcant hike of
terror events occurs in Europe ( β5 =1 .869).
5 Conclusions
This paper analysis the link between the VDAX as a proxy for European
ﬁnancial uncertainty and the number of terror incidents in Western Europe.
Based on data of the Global Terrorism Database, the number of terror in-
cidents contains no signiﬁcant explanatory information for ﬁnancial uncer-
tainty. Hence, ”normal” terrorism does not aﬀect ﬁnancial uncertainty. Con-
trary, extraordinary terror events like 9/11 have a deep impact on ﬁnancial
uncertainty.
The presented counterfactual model of terror incidents rely on two be-
havioral assumptions. Firstly, the percentage change of the expected utility
of a terror event decreases with increasing ﬁnancial uncertainty. Secondly,
the number of terror incidents are proportional to the expected utility of a
terror event. The underlying argument for the ﬁrst hypothesis accounts for
the statement of Schmid and de Graaf (1982) that ”terrorism is a violent
strategy of communication”. In face of economic turbulence expressed in ﬁ-
nancial uncertainty terror events attract less attention. Hence, the expected
13utility of communication via terrorism decreases. Dependent on the level of
expected terror utility for the perpetrator the incentive for an incident varies
proportional.
The two step negative binomial quasi-generalized pseudo-maximum like-
lihood estimation eﬃciently estimates the count model for European terror
incidents during 1992 to 2007 on the bases of monthly data. Accounting
for dynamics of the time series a trend and lagged incidents are included
in the count data model. The signiﬁcantly estimated negative trend shows
decreasing terror events in Western Europe and positive dependence between
current and lagged incidents implies terror persistence. Moreover, in August
2001 (previous month to 9/11) signiﬁcantly more incidents occurred. Esti-
mation results conﬁrm the behavioral model and lead to the conclusion of
the importance of ﬁnancial uncertainty for terror events. Furthermore, it
can be concluded that on average 6 month are necessary to plan an incident.
Based on the results of this paper, the level of ﬁnancial uncertainty contains
information concerning the risk of a terror event. This result is potentially
important for terror prevention.
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Appendix
Deﬁnition of Western Europe according GTD:
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Isle of Man, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland
15Table 2: Fundamental stock market uncertainty shocks
Event Date Type Dummy
Asian crisis November 1997 Economic dasia
Russian, LTCM default September 1998 Economic drussia
9/11 terrorist attack September 2001 Terror d9/11
Worldcom and Enron July 2002 Economic denron
Gulf war II February 2003 War dgulf
Credit crunch August 2007 Economic dcrunch
The dummy variables contain the value 1 at the appropriate dates and 0
elsewhere.
Table 3: Regression results
a) Equation (6): VDAX, Method: OLS, R2 =0 .92
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8
2.095 0.889 9.856 18.364 22.397 18.206 0.978 5.082
(0.680) (0.030) (0.313) (0.453) (0.240) (0.482) (0.353) (0.198)
b) Equation (7): EI, Method: Poisson count, R2 =0 .54
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
2.726 -0.010 0.006 12.710 1.831
(0.239) (0.001) (0.003) (3.484) (0.348)
c) Equation (7): EI, Method: Negative binomial count, R2 =0 .52
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
2.832 -0.010 0.008 11.028 1.869
(0.246) (0.001) (0.004) (3.368) (0.667)




Sample: 1992:1-2007:12. Standard errors in brackets. a) shows heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Furthermore, the Breusch-Godfrey test of the residuals does
not reject the hypotheses of no serial correlation on any plausible level of signiﬁcance and
lag order. b) and c) show GLM robust standard errors. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
least on the 5% level. The correlogram of the standardized residuals and residual squares
of c) leads to the conclusion of no serial correlation on any plausible level of signiﬁcance.
16